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SUMMARY

While piracy is an age-old phenomenon plaguing mankind,
terrorism at sea has only manifested itself in recent times through the
Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985 serving as a wake-up call. The international community has since been striving to adopt a series of legal as
well as practical measures in order to prevent a recurrence of such a
terroristact because the rules of internationallaw relating to piracy are
not applicable mutatis mutandis to terrorism. The Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
was adopted in 1988. This Convention addressedterrorism at sea for the
first time and represented an important extension of a cooperative law
enforcement regime into a wholly new area containing a finely balanced
aut dedere aut iudicare scheme.
* The author is a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea in
Hamburg. For many years he has served as a member of the Austrian delegation
to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and has also
represented his country at subsequent meetings and negotiations in that field.
Opinions expressed in this article are personal.
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In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it
became obvious that the 1988 Convention required revision and
updating because the Convention focused on reactions to a terrorist act
rather than its prevention. The amendments of 2005 significantly expand
the scope of the Convention by providing an internationaltreaty framework for combating and prosecuting individuals who use a ship as a
weapon, as a means of committing a terroristattack, or transportterrorists or cargo intended for use in connection with weapons of mass
destruction programs. Furthermore, the Convention establishes a
mechanism to facilitate with the explicit authorization of the flag
State the boardingof vessels suspected of engaging in these activities in
internationalwaters.
A. INTRODUCTION
On October 7, 1985, the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flag cruise ship, was
seized while sailing from Alexandria to Port Said.' It was unclear
whether the initial seizure was on the high seas or within the territorial
waters of Egypt, however, there was no doubt that the ship was on the
high seas while being held by the hijackers.2 The four Palestinian
hijackers boarded the ship in Genoa, posing as tourists, and managed to
smuggle on board automatic weapons, grenades and other explosives.3
The hijackers held the ship's crew and passengers hostage and threatened
to kill passengers unless Israel released 50 Palestinian prisoners. In
addition, the hijackers threatened to blow up the ship if a rescue mission
was attempted, and when their demands were not met, one of the
passengers was murdered.4 The passengers held hostage hailed from a
number of different countries, including Italy, the United States and

1 Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 269 (1988).
2 See id.

3 Brad J. Kieserman, Preventing and Defeating Terrorism at Sea: Practical
Considerationsfor the Implementation of the Draft Protocol to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA), in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND CHINA, 425,

425 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, & Kuen-chen Fu, eds. 2005).
4 Id.; Glen Plant, The Conventionfor the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of MaritimeNavigation, 39 INT'L & COmP. L. Q. 27 (1990).
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Austria. This hijacking constituted one of the first genuine acts of
maritime terrorism recorded in modern history.'
The outrage that resulted from this terrorist act prompted a quick
response by the international community. On November 2 0th , 1985, the
Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted
Resolution A. 584(14) on "Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which
Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of Their Passengers and
Crews". 6 This resolution called on all governments, port authorities and
administrations, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, and crews to
review and strengthen port and onboard security noting "the danger to
passengers and crews resulting from the increasing number of incidents
involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or on
board ships". 7 Resolution A. 584(14) also directed the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee, "to develop, on a priority basis, detailed and practical
technical measures ... to ensure the security of passengers and crews on
board ships." s The Committee was further invited to take note of the
work of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the
development of standards and recommended practices for airport and
aircraft security. 9
The actions taken by the IMO had the full support of the United
Nations General Assembly. In Resolution 40/61, adopted by consensus
on December 9 t", 1985,10 the Assembly unequivocally condemned "as
criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by
whomever committed," and requested that the IMO "study the problem
of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures.""1 The insertion of this request in
the resolution was proposed by Austria and Italy in order to reflect the
concern of the international community at the seizure of the Achille

' See Rosalie Balkin, The InternationalMaritime Organization and Maritime
Security, 30 TUL. MAR. L. J. 1, 5 (Winter/Summer, 2006).
6 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Measures to Prevent Unlawful
Acts Which Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of Their Passengers
and
Crews, IMO Res. A.584(14) (Nov. 20, 1985).
7
id
8 Id.; see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 6.
9Id.
10 G.A. Res. 40/61,
15, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985).
11Id.
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Lauro and to endorse any steps taken in connection with the framework
of the IMO.
On December 18, 1985, the Security Council also addressed the
Achille Lauro incident in Resolution 579. This resolution recalls the
statement by its President of October 9 th , 1985, which resolutely condemns all acts of terrorism, including hostage taking, and urges the
further development of international cooperation among States in
devising and adopting effective measures to facilitate the prevention,
prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage taking and abduction
as manifestations of international terrorism. 12
In September 1986, in response to the directive of the IMO
Assembly and the request by the UN General Assembly, the IMO
Maritime Safety Committee adopted measures aimed at minimizing the
risk of terrorist acts directed against ships and their crews on the basis of
a proposal by the United States of America. 13 These recommendations
specifically applied to passenger ships engaged on international voyages
of twenty-four hours or more, as well as the port facilities that serviced
such ships.' 4 The measures adopted by the IMO Maritime Safety
Committee anticipated the much more detailed International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted in 2002 by stressing the need
for port facilities and individual ships to formulate security plans and
appoint security officers. 15
It was obvious that adopting practical measures to counter the
threat of international terrorism against international shipping was itself
sufficient because of the possibility that applying these measures,
however stringent, might not by itself prevent a terrorist attack from
succeeding. Thus, it became apparent that legal measures were necessary
to prevent such acts and to ensure that the perpetrators of such acts were
made duly accountable. Because these acts are committed on the high
seas and the perpetrators as well as the victims hail from various countries that may not include that of the ship's flag, new international rules
were necessary. More specifically, there was a need for rules relating to
the arrest, prosecution, and subsequent detention of those responsible for
12 S.C.

Res. 579, 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/579 (Dec.18, 1985).
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten the Safety of Ships

13 IMO,

and the Security of Their Passengers and Crews, IMO Doc. MSC 52/INF. 9
(Jan. 15, 1986).
14 Balkin, supra note 5, at
6.
15 id.
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6
acts
of maritime
terrorism.1
The existing legal framework seemed
inadequate
to deal with
such situations.

B. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF MARITIME
TERRORISM

After the seizure of the Achille Lauro, many people contemplated the
appropriate legal response to the terrorist act with a view towards
preventing its recurrence in the future. The first question that needed to
be answered was whether the seizure of that ship constituted an act of
piracy. The act had been characterized as such by some, in particular the
United States, which issued arrest warrants charging the hijackers with
hostage taking, conspiracy and "piracy on the high seas."' However,
there is no authoritative definition of piracy under customary international law and the municipal law of a number of countries is based on an
extensive interpretation of a notion that has been defined as broadly as
"any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war."' 8
Bear in mind that the notion of piracy, first codified in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas 19 and later in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 had been circumscribed by
these legal instruments in a precise and definitely narrower sense. 21
Article 15 of the 1958 Convention and Article 101 of the 1982 Convention define piracy as:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention, or any
act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
16

Id. at 7.

17See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 270.
8 Id.

at 273.

19Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
21 See Rfldiger Wolfrum, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations
under InternationalLaw, in VERHANDELN FOR DEN FRIEDEN-NEGOTIATION
FOR PEACE LIBER AMICORUM TONO ETEL 649, 652 (Jochen Frowein, Klaus

Scharioth, Ingo Winkelmann, & Rfidiger Wolfrum eds., 2003); Tullio Treves,
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
MaritimeNavigation, 2 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 541, 542 (1998).
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(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State.22
The practice of piracy has been widespread over the centuries
and continues to be a menace. As a result, every State not only has a
right, but also a duty, to take action to curb piratical activities. Article
100 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides
that "all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside of the
jurisdiction of any State." 23

Piracy is the oldest and one of the few crimes where universal
jurisdiction has been recognized generally under customary international
law, 24 whereas universal jurisdiction for other offenses depends upon
specified conditions. The right to take enforcement measures against
pirates is vested in all States; not only those which have suffered from an
act of violence. States accepted universal jurisdiction over piracy because
pirates indiscriminately attacked all States' ships and were a threat to
everyone. 25 Universal jurisdiction was theoretically justified because
26
pirates were considered hostis humani generis, enemies of all mankind.
Furthermore, pirates were not subject to the authority of any State.
Therefore, no State could be held responsible under international law for
acts of pirates.27
Similar theories may be applied to terrorists as they are also a
threat to all States. Secondly, no State is willing to assume responsibility
for their actions. However, while piracy and terrorism at sea have many
22

Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, at art. 15; United Nations Con-

vention on the Law of the Sea, supranote 20, at art. 101.
23 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 20, at art. 100.
24 Halberstam, supra note 1, at 272.
25

26

at 288.
Id.; H.E. Jos6 Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and

Id.

Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 384
(2003); Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of
Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September I1th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257,
259 (2002 2003).
27 Halberstam, supra note 1, at 288.
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similarities and both are forms of violent interference with shipping,
there is a marked difference between the goals of pirates and terrorists:
while pirates usually seek financial gain, terrorists wish to make a
"political or ideological" point, most often coupled with the wanton
destruction of human life. 28 Furthermore, pirates act with stealth, while
terrorists seek publicity with their actions. 29 From the point of view of
prosecuting the offenders, there is an advantage to qualifying acts of
maritime terrorism as "piracy"-especially given the Achille Lauro
incident.
In examining these issues, the Legal Advisors of the Foreign
Ministries of Austria, the author, Italy and Egypt were not persuaded by
the argument that the seizure of the Achille Lauro could be considered an
act of piracy as defined in the aforementioned 1958 and 1982 Conventions because the hijackers did not act for "private ends," and the seizure
did not meet the two vessel requirement. 30 There was an obvious legal
lacuna which would have to be filled by creating a specific convention
relating to maritime terrorism because the development of international
law regarding unlawful acts against ships had not yet reached the same
stage as it had with respect to civil aviation. In aviation, the 1963 Tokyo
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation-elaborated
within the framework of ICAO-were already in force. 3 1 However, no
28

See Leticia Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, On the Problem of Utilizing Unilateral

Action to Prevent Acts of Sea Piracy and Terrorism: A Proactive Approach to
the Evolution of InternationalLaw, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1 (20042005); Tammy N. Sittnick, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the
Strait of Malacca: PersuadingIndonesia and Malaysia to take Additional Steps
to Secure the Strait, 14 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 743, 751 (2005).
29 See Sittnick, supra note 28.
30 Jesus, supra note 26, at 388; see also Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988
Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. REV. INT'L L. 133, 144 (2006).
31 See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Dec. 22, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Mar. 8, 1973, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; IMO,
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convention existed that dealt with maritime terrorism. Terrorism at sea,
in contrast to piracy, had never before been a serious international
problem; thus, there was a lack of specific international rules on
maritime terrorism.
The position of the three Legal Advisors was also supported by
the International Transport Workers Federation, which called for an
international convention on ship hijacking to mirror those conventions
already in force in the case of civil aviation hijacking.32 Particular
reference was made to the Hague Convention which commits the
Contracting States to making such hijackings punishable by "severe
penalties" 3
As a consequence, Austria, Italy and Egypt proposed to elaborate
a new international convention to deal specifically with the issue of
maritime terrorism modelled on existing anti-terrorism conventions,
particularly the Hague and Montreal Conventions, as well as the 1979
UN Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.34
Such a convention would provide for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed against
the safety of maritime navigation which endanger
innocent human lives, jeopardize the safety of persons
and property, seriously affect the operations of maritime
services and thus are of grave concern to the international community as a whole.3

Consideration of a Draft Convention for the Suppression of Maritime Navigation, at annex 2, C 57/25 (Oct. 1, 1986).
32 IMO, Assembly Resolution on Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which

Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of Their Passengers and Crews, at
Press Release, 52/2/4 (Oct. 11, 1985).
33

Id.
34 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,

T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
35 IMO, Assembly Resolution on Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which
Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of Their Passengers and Crews,
supra note 32, at annex 3; Thomas A. Mensah, Suppression of Terrorism at Sea:
Developments in the Wake of the Events of 1 September 2001, in VERHANDELN
FOR DEN FRIEDEN

NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE LIBER AMICORUM TONO ETEL

627, 629 (Jochen Frowein, Klaus Scharioth, Ingo Winkelmann, & Rtidiger

Wolfrum eds., 2003).
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Following the title of the Montreal Convention the three sponsoring countries called their draft "Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation" .36 In submitting this text, they pointed out that it was necessary to make a clear
distinction between the cases covered by the proposed new convention
and piracy, since the latter was governed by a different regime that is
internationally codified, and the customary law of the sea. The same
being true for hot pursuit, the new convention should be without prejudice to the legal rules regarding international piracy and hot pursuit.
In November 1986, the IMO Council unanimously agreed that
the matter was appropriate for consideration by the IMO and that it
required urgent attention. Following a suggestion made by the co-sponsors with a view to expediting the negotiation process, an Ad Hoc
Preparatory Committee open to all States was established with "the mandate to prepare, on a priority basis, a Draft Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation," using
as a basis the draft submitted by Austria, Egypt and Italy. 37 This Committee concluded its work within one year and the Convention was
adopted by consensus on March 10 th, 1988 by a Diplomatic Conference
held in Rome.38
At the Conference the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General made it clear that the "two-vessel requirement" and
the "private ends" criterion made rules on piracy inapplicable to
maritime terrorism. On the other hand, it would seem that acts of piracy
or armed robbery at sea could also qualify as unlawful acts under the
Convention if they met the definition of the offences set forth therein.39

36

See generally IMO, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recom-

mendations and Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, I.L.M. 688, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
17 See IMO, (Working Paper Doc. C 57/WP.1,
25(a)(2), 1986) quoted in
Halberstam, supranote 1, at 292 n.99.
38 IMO, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and
Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar.
10, 1988, I.L.M. 688, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
39 See N.D. Korolyova, International Legal Issues of Cooperation Between
States in Suppressing Piracy and Terrorism: Some Aspects, in MOSCOW
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 174, 177 (Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. &
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During deliberations on the Convention, the United States,
supported by other coastal States having fixed platforms on their continental shelves, proposed that such installations be protected from
terrorist acts. 40 However, the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee decided to
deal with this question outside of the Convention itself. Instead, the
question was addressed in an optional protocol supplementary to the
Convention. 41 This resulted in the simultaneous adoption by the
Diplomatic Conference of a "Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
42
,,

Shelf.

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation entered into force on March 1, 1992. 4 3
Initially, until September 11, 2001, it had only been ratified by 67 States.
Yet, it has since found overwhelming support by the international
community.44 At present, there are 146 Contracting States party to the
Convention accounting for 87.74 percent of world tonnage and the
Protocol has been ratified by 135 States accounting for 83.06 percent of
world tonnage.45 This development reflects the seriousness with which
the international community has in recent years taken the threat of
international terrorism, and its effects at sea. 46

Anatoly L. Kolodkin eds., Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1988);
See also Treves, supra note 21, at 544.
40 Philippe Kirsch, The 1988 ICAO and IMO Conferences: An International
Consensus Against Terrorism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 5, 13 (1989-1990).
41 IMO, Report of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee, Doc. C58/8/Add.1, at
para. 4 (available upon request from the IMO).
42 IMO, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, I.L.M. 688, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, available
at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id-259&doc id=686.
43Id.

44 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 434.
45

See IMO,Summary of Conventions as at 31 December 2007, http://www.imo.
org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id=247.
46 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 434.
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C. THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF 47
MARITIME NAVIGATION (SUA) AND PROTOCOL

As already stated, the SUA Convention in substance is based on previously existing anti-terrorism conventions by adapting their provisions
to the maritime field. However, it is also a "genuine" anti-terrorism convention because, in the Preamble, there is a deep concern about "the
world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, the occurrence
of which is considered a matter of grave concern to the international
community as a whole.,, 48 Furthermore, the preamble quotes from the
aforementioned General Assembly Resolution 40/61 concerning the
unequivocal condemnation as criminal of all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism. 49 Such references were not made in the Hague, Tokyo and
Montreal Conventions. In order to achieve the necessary political
compromise and secure the adoption of the Convention by consensus, the
preamble quotes another paragraph of Resolution 40/61 which refers to
the need that "all States contribute to the progressive elimination of
causes underlying international terrorism."50 There is, however, no
authoritative definition of this term. Additionally, there was no attempt to
create such a definition at the Diplomatic Conference. The failure to do
so was a wise decision because defining such a term would certainly
have led to insurmountable political difficulties.
The preamble further affirms that matters not regulated by the
Convention "continue to be governed by the rules and principles of
general international law."'" Article 9 further spells out that "nothing in
the Convention shall affect in any way the rules of international law
pertaining to the competence of States to exercise investigative or
enforcement jurisdiction on board ships not flying their flag., 5 2 In
striving for consensus at the Diplomatic Conference the co-sponsors had
purposely avoided tackling highly controversial issues, such as the
47 See Plant, supra note 4, at 27-56 (a detailed analysis of the provisions of the

SUA Convention).
48 See id. at 32-34.
49 See id. at 32; G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 10.
50 See Plant, supra note 4 at 32; G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 10.
51See Plant, supra note 4, at 33.
52 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 9, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 22; see Plant, supra note 4,
at 45.
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boarding of suspect vessels at sea by non-flag State authorities. The
issues were not yet ripe for resolution.
A proposal by Kuwait to include a provision in the Convention
that it would apply to a person who commits an offense acting on behalf
of a government 53 did not find majority support at the Conference. The
same was true of a proposal first made by Saudi Arabia, and then by
Nicaragua, to include references to "crimes" committed by governments. 54 A similar suggestion had also been made by Iran in the course
of the deliberations on the text of the Convention.55
The SUA Convention applies to ships navigating or scheduled to
navigate into, through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the
territorial sea of a single state, or beyond the lateral limits of its territorial
sea with adjacent States, or when the alleged offender is found in the
territory of a State Party.56 Thus, the SUA Convention is applicable to
ships on an international voyage operating or scheduled to operate seaward of any State's territorial sea. The covered territory is a potentially
vast geographic area into which many States would find it difficult to
project an enforcement presence much beyond their respective littorals.57
Ships engaged in cabotage that takes place exclusively within the territorial sea of a coastal state-so-called short range cabotage-are thus
excluded and any unlawful act directed against them is governed solely
by national law.58 In conformity with general international law of
sovereign immunities, warships or government vessels used for naval,
customs or police purposes are excluded from the ambit of the
Convention.59
Although entitled "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation," the SUA's operative
See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 305 06.
See Kirsch, supranote 13, at 27 28; Halberstam, supra note 1, at 306.
55
See IMO, Doc. A/C.2/WP.1.
56 See IMO, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations
and Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference: Protocol of 2005
to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) (available
from the IMO upon request).
57 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 427.
58 Balkin, supra note 5, at 9.
59 See David Freestone, The 1988 InternationalConventionfor the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 3 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 305, 308 (1988); Balkin, supra note 5, at 8.
53
54
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provisions deal primarily with events after illegal acts have taken place;
that is the apprehension, conviction and punishment of those who commit such acts, as opposed to the prevention or suppression of those acts. 60
Only one provision directly addresses the problem of prevention or
suppression: Article 13 requires States Parties to cooperate in the prevention of offenses by taking all practical measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of the offences
within or outside their territories as well as to exchange information and
61
to coordinate measures to prevent the commission of those offences.
Furthermore, there is a duty for a States Parties that have a reason to
believe that an offense set forth in the Convention will be committed to
furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information
to those States
62
having established jurisdiction over such offenses.
Similar to most international anti-terrorism conventions, the core
provision of the SUA Convention, enshrined in Article 10, is the requirement for States to "extradite or prosecute., 63 This provision is substantially the same as the corresponding provision of the Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages. Thus, there is no absolute obligation to extradite;
the possibility of non-extradition for political offences as well as the
right to grant asylum are maintained. "In the absence of specific extradition treaties in force between the requesting and requested States, the
latter may at its option consider the Convention as a legal basis for
extradition."64
Furthermore, there is no absolute duty to punish because the State
in whose territory the offender is found is only required "to submit the
case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution," which "shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that
State.,' 65 This provision, although it corresponds to other anti-terrorism
conventions, has been called a deficiency of the SUA Convention since it
arguably allows terrorists to escape punishment. People are left to trust
60
61

Sittnick, supranote 28, at 760-61; Kieserman, supra note 3, at 427.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Mari-

time Navigation art. 13, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 22.
62 See id.
63 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 427.
64 Tiribelli, supra note 30, at 149; see also Treves, supra note 21, at 552 53.
65 Treves, supra note 21, at 552.
66 See id.
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the independence and efficiency of the judiciary systems called upon to
deal with such offenders.
In support of the framework-dedere aut iudicare-States
Parties are required to establish their jurisdiction over specified offenses
and make these offenses punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account their grave nature. The idea behind such a provision is to
ensure that terrorists will not find a safe haven in any territories of those
States that are parties to the Convention. 6' There is, however, no binding
obligation, but only a discretion, to extradite to the flag State rather than
another State because only "due regard" is to be paid to the interests and
responsibilities of the State Party whose flag the ship was flying at the
time of the commission of the offence. A clear priority in favor of the
flag State proved unacceptable to many States at the Diplomatic Conference in view of difficulties with domestic legislation. 68
The offenses covered by the Convention are listed in Article 3
and substantially reproduce mutatis mutandis those provided for in the
aviation precedents. 69 At the initiative of the United States, a new offense
was added for injuring or killing a person in connection with the commission, or attempted commission, of any of the other offenses. °
The SUA Convention established extraditable offenses of direct
involvement, or complicity, in the intentional and unlawful threatened,
attempted or actual endangerment of the safe navigation of a ship by: the
commission or attempt of seizure or exercise of control over a ship by
any form of intimidation; violence against a person on board a ship;
destruction of a ship; the causing of damage to a ship or to its cargo;
placement on a ship of a device or substance which is likely to destroy or
cause damage to that ship or its cargo; destruction of, serious damaging
of, or interference with maritime navigational facilities; knowing communication of false information; and injury to or murder of any person in
connection with any of the preceding acts. 71 These offenses are also
deemed to be includable as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty
existing between any of the States Parties.

67 See id. at 553; see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 9.

See Plant, supra note 4, at 50, 55.
Id. at 40.
70 See Kirsch, supranote 40, at 18.
71 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 427 28.
68
69
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Article 6 established two types of jurisdiction; namely, obligatory
and discretionary." A State Party is obliged to establish domestic law
jurisdiction over those offenses committed against, or on board, a ship
flying the flag of the State at the time the offense is committed, or in the
territory of that State, including its territorial sea, or by a national of that
State. Furthermore, a State Party may establish jurisdiction over any such
offense, when: it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or during its commission a national of that State is
seized, threatened, injured or killed; or it is committed in an attempt to
compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act. The inclusion of
discretionary jurisdiction represented a compromise between the States
that supported obligatory jurisdiction, derived from the nationality of the
victim or from coercion of a State, and those who opposed any sort of
jurisdiction on these grounds.7 3
Furthermore, Article 6 contains the important obligation for a
State Party to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses in question in
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and the State
does not extradite him to any of the States Parties having established4
their jurisdiction in accordance with the aforementioned provisions.1
This rule underlines the fact that the punishment of the offences covered
by the SUA Convention is a common goal of the international community even though it does not contain a specific provision on universal
jurisdiction. 5
In addition to the obligations to establish offenses, jurisdiction
and punishment, and to prosecute or extradite, States Parties are obliged
to take alleged offenders into custody, or secure their presence for trial,
cooperate in preventative measures and exchange information and
evidence needed in related criminal proceedings.76
Article 8 permits the master of a ship to deliver to the authorities
of any other State Party any person who he has reasonable grounds to
believe has committed one of the offences set forth in Article 3 and all
pertinent evidence in the master's possession. Whenever practicable,
Plant, supra note 4, at 44.
Id. at 46.
74
See id. at 44.
75 See Freestone, supra note 59, at 310.
76 See Freestone, supra note 59, at 312 (describing the duties of the holding
state).
77 Kieserman, supra note 3, at 428; Plant, supra note 4, at 48.
72
73
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the master is obliged to give the receiving State advance notification of
his intention to deliver such person and the reasons therefore, possibly
before entering that State's territorial sea. The receiving State must
accept the delivery, except where it has grounds to consider that the
Convention is not applicable to the acts giving rise to the delivery. It may
then refuse to accept a delivery by presenting a statement of the reasons
for refusal. 78 A receiving State that accepts the delivery of a person in
this manner may in turn request that the flag State accept delivery of that
person. 79
This provision was included in the SUA Convention in order to
address those cases where the ship is navigating far from the flag State,
flying a flag of convenience, or of a landlocked State, since few ships are
equipped to keep alleged offenders on board for long periods of time.80
This right of a master of a ship has been criticized as placing the
potentially politically sensitive decision to choose the State of delivery in
the hands of a private citizen.81 It seems, however, highly unlikely that
the master of a vessel would take such a decision without previously
consulting his competent authorities. In addition, the practical effect of
that provision appears rather limited as it is difficult to imagine that the
crew of a commercial vessel or a passenger ship would be in a position to
overpower and detain terrorists.
The elaboration of the "Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf' was motivated by the possibility of a terrorist seizure of an oil or
gas platform. s2 The Protocol aims to provide a similar regime for fixed
platforms located on the continental shelf. Similar to the Convention's
treatment of vessels, most of the articles of the Convention are applied
mutatis mutandis. A fixed platform is defined as "an artificial island,
installation or structure permanently attached to the sea-bed for the
purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or for other economic
71
79

See Plant, supra note 4, at 48.
[d.

80 [d.
81
82

Id.; see also Freestone, supra note 59, at 314-15.
See IMO,Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations

and Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference Protocol of 2005 to
the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 15/22 (Nov. 1,
2005) (available from the IMO upon request).
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purposes.

83

excluded.

84

Military style or defense installations are thus de facto

The offenses listed in Article 2 of the Protocol correspond to
those in Article 3 of the Convention when the offenses take place on
board, or against a platform located on the continental shelf of a State
Party, with the exception of the offenses relating to the endangerment of
safe navigation.85 In addition, Article 3 of the Protocol is identical
mutatis mutandis to Article 6 of the Convention, except that the separate
grounds for establishing obligatory jurisdiction based on registry of the
ship and location within a State's territory are replaced with a single
ground for such jurisdiction based on the location of a platform on a
State's continental shelf.86 Article 4 of the Protocol is similar to Article 9
of the SUA Convention and states that the rules of international law
pertaining to fixed platforms on the continental shelf are not affected in
any way by its provisions. 87

D. NEW FORMS OF TERRORISM AND THE UPDATING
OF THE

1988 SUA CONVENTION AND Protocol 8

Since the SUA entered into effect in 1992, terrorism and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction have increasingly plagued global
security. In a number of resolutions, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council have emphasized the duty of States to
prevent terrorism and deny all forms of support and safe haven to
terrorists, as well as those supporting terrorism. They have also
developed a link between terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.89
id.
See Freestone, supra note 59, at 315 16.
85 Plant, supra note 4, at 52.
86
[d.
87 See Article 9 of the SUA Convention and Article 4 of the Protocol, supra
83
84

notes 36 and 42.
8 See generally Christopher Young, BalancingMaritime Security and Freedom
of Navigation on the High Seas: A Study of the MultilateralNegotiation Process
in Action, 24 U. Q.L.J. & R. 355 (2005) (containing a detailed description of the
negotiating process).
89 See Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the boat: The Legal and PracticalProblems
of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 341, 367
(2002-2003); see also Wolfrum, supra note 21, at 664-65.
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Transnational networks of terrorists have global reach and make
common cause to pose a threat to all nations. 90 The traumatic events of
September 11, 2001 have exposed the vulnerability of the global transport infrastructure both as a potential target for terrorist activity and a
potential weapon of mass destruction. 91 The shift towards containerization in the transportation of general cargo has reduced transparency in
the shipping industry and greatly enhanced the potential risk of terrorist
attack. The efficiency of containerized systems makes containers a
potential security threat because the emphasis on speed means that cargo
is rarely inspected.92 Actual and planned acts of terrorism against
shipping have targeted vessels either in port or close to the shore.93
Furthermore, the perils to commercial shipping have been heightened by
an increased danger of possible coordinated efforts by terrorists and
pirates, especially in important areas of international maritime transportation. 94 It is estimated that more than 90% of world trade is carried by
sea. Thus, terrorist incidents, particularly when they occurred in
vulnerable and strategic sea routes, had the potential for a severe
disruption of international trade.95
It was evident that the previous work of the IMO to combat
terrorism at sea was insufficient to prevent this new kind of terrorist
activity from posing a serious threat to the safety of international
shipping.96 The provisions of the SUA Convention and similar international agreements would not deter suicidal offenders to whom the
possibility of criminal prosecution was probably of no concern. 97 In light
of these considerations, in November 2001, the IMO Assembly adopted
Resolution A.924(22) calling for "a review of the existing international
legal and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against

90

The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security

and Human Rights for All, 87 U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
9'Balkin, supra note 5, at 16.
92 Mellor, supra note 89, at 348.
93Smarttraveler.gov, Shipping and Ports, http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zwcgi/view/Advice/shippin and ports (last visited January 25, 2008).
14 Sittnick. supra note 28, at 744; see also Erik Barrios, Note: Casting a Wider
Net: Addressing the Maritime PiracyProblem in Southeast Asia, 28 B.C. INT'L
& CoMp. L. REV., Winter 2005, at 149, 151.
9'
Balkin, supra note 5, at 2.
96
1d. at 16.
97 See Wolfrum, supra note 21, at 660 61.
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ships at sea and in port and to improve security aboard and ashore, in
order to reduce any associated risk to passengers, crews and port
personnel on board ships and in port areas and to the vessels and their
cargoes".98 The committees were given the task "to review, on a high
priority basis, the instruments under their purview to determine whether
they should be updated and whether there was a need to adopt other
maritime security measures". 99
As a consequence, a Diplomatic Conference held in December
2002 adopted a series of wide-ranging new security measures.' 00 Amendments were added to the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) addressing special measures to enhance maritime security.
Additionally, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS) was adopted and made in part mandatory under the amended
SOLAS Convention.101 This new comprehensive maritime security
regime for international shipping entered into force on July 1, 2004.102
The ISPS Code is a comprehensive set of measures designed to
enhance the security of ships and port facilities. It contains detailed
mandatory security requirements for governments, port authorities and
the shipping companies as well as a series of non-mandatory guidelines
regarding the implementation of these requirements. The Code covers
both passenger ships and cargo ships, including tankers, weighing 500
gross tonnage or more as well as port facilities serving
ships on interna1 3
tional voyages and mobile offshore drilling units. 0
Whereas these instruments provide the technical framework for
ensuring that ships and port facilities are rendered as safe as possible
from terrorist attacks, they obviously do not guarantee that such attacks
98

IMO, Renewal of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism

Which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of Ships,
IMO Res. A.924(22) (Nov. 20, 2001); see Balkin, supra note 5 at 16.
99 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222.
10'Balkin, supra note 5, at 17.
101The ISPS Code contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A),
together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a
second, non-mandatory section (Part B). Tiribelli, supra note 30, at 148 n.39;
Phil DeCaro, Safety Among Dragons: East Asia and Maritime Security, 33
TRANSP. L.J. 227, 234 (2005 2006).
102 See Tiribelli, supra note 30, at 147.
103 Balkin, supra note 5, at 17.
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will not occur. In compliance with the aforementioned Resolution of the
IMO Assembly, in October 2002, the Legal Committee began reexamining the provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol on
the basis of a draft text submitted by an open-ended "Correspondence
Group" under the leadership of the United States. 10 4 The conclusion was
that the categories of unlawful acts set forth in these legal instruments
were too narrow and would require expansion in order to cope with
modern day terrorist threats, including threats from biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons or material. 10 5 It was further acknowledged that
these instruments did not include provisions that would allow law
enforcement officials to board foreign flag ships on the high seas, either
to search for alleged terrorists or their weapons, or to render assistance to
a vessel suspected of being under attack. 10 6 The drafting of such provisions became one of the main focuses of the revision exercise. 107 The
drafting also sought to ensure that freedom of navigation, the right of
innocent passage, and the basic principles of international law and the
operation of international commercial shipping would not be
jeopardized.1 08
With respect to the question of whether the titles of the SUA
Convention and Protocol should be amended to include the term
"terrorist acts" it was considered that such an amendment would not be
appropriate since the amending instruments were merely protocols to an
existing Convention and Protocol. Although the treaties retained the term
"unlawful acts," it was nevertheless understood that the object and
purpose of these treaties was to deal with acts of terrorism and to provide
a legal framework for the apprehension and prosecution of alleged
terrorists. 10 9 Furthermore, in February 2005, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 59/24 inviting States "to participate in the
review of those instruments by the IMO Legal Committee in order to
104See Balkin, supra note 5, at 25; see also Young, supra note 88, at 358;
Mensah, supra note 35, at 640.
105Balkin, supra note 5, at 23.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Tiribelli, supra note 30, at 147 n.36; see also Center for Nonproliferation

Studies, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/
inven/pdfs/maritime/pdf.
109Balkin, supra note 5, at 24.
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strengthen the means of combating such unlawful acts, including terrorist
acts."' 10The General Assembly urged States "to take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of the instruments in
question, in particular through the adoption of legislation, where
appropriate, aimed at ensuring that there is a proper framework for
responses to incidents of armed robbery and terrorist acts at sea."1"'
The IMO Legal Committee completed its work amending the
Protocols in April 2005. The amendments were adopted by consensus on
October 1 4 th, 20051 12 at the International Conference on the Revision of
the SUA Treaties-one of the most politically charged conferences in the
history of the Organization." 3 By decision of the Conference, the
original 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol, amended respectively by
the two 2005 SUA Protocols, constitute single instruments now called
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 2005 (the 2005 SUA Convention) and of the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of fixed Platforms
located on the Continental Shelf, 2005 (2005 SUA Fixed Platforms
Protocol). 114
110See

G.A. Res. 59/24, 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/24 (Nov. 17, 2004).

111
Id.
112IMO,Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and
Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference: Protocol of 2005 to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) (available from
the IMO upon request); IMO,Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments,
Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference:
Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO Doc.
LEG/CONF. 15/22 (Nov. 1, 2005) (available from the IMO upon request). Three
delegations-India, Pakistan, and Russia-however, made statements regarding
provisions in the Protocol, such as concern over references to rights and responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaties and their possible application to
State Parties which are not also a party to these instruments in article 2bis and
3bis, and concern over the "dual use" provisions in article 3bis. See Young,
supra note 88, at 384 n.145.
113 IMO,International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties: Closing
Statement by Secretary-General, As Delivered, (Oct. 14, 2005) (available from
the IMO upon request).
114 Agustin Blanco-Bazdn, Suppressing Unlawful Acts: IMO Incursion in
the
Field of Criminal Law, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
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In its resolution 61/222, adopted on March 14t", 2007,1' 5 the
General Assembly invited States to become parties to these instruments.
116 The amended SUA Convention and its Protocol
have thus far been
signed by eighteen States. The amendments to the Convention will enter
into force 90 days after twelve countries have become parties. The
requirement for the entry into force of the amendments to the Protocol on
Fixed Platforms is adherence by three countries. 1 7 To date, the amendments to the Convention have been ratified by two States. 18 The
amended Protocol has not yet received any ratification. It will only
become operational when the 2005 SUA Convention enters into force.11 9

E. THE PROTOCOLS OF 2005

TO THE

1988 SUA

CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL

The core provisions of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention
are Article 3bis, which substantially enlarges the offenses covered by the
Convention and Article 8bis, which relates to ship boarding and provides
a mechanism through which the international community may enforce
the provisions.
Because of the major changes brought about by the
various amendments, it might have been more practical, from a legal
standpoint, to draw up an entirely new Convention instead of inserting so
many new substantive provisions into an existing text. However,
adherence by States to these new legal rules will certainly be facilitated
by their crafting onto an international instrument that has already been
widely ratified.
In its preamble, the Protocol acknowledges that terrorist acts
threaten international peace and security. There are references to the
necessity of adopting provisions supplementary to those of the Convention in order to suppress additional terrorist acts of violence against the
DISPUTES 720 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rudiger Wolfrum eds.,
2007).
115 G.A. Res. 61/222, 59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/221, (Mar. 16, 2007).
SETTLEMENT OF

116 id.

117

See Summary of Conventions, supra note 45.

118 id.

19 Id
Caitlin A. Harrington, HeightenedSecurity: The need to IncorporateArticles
3bis(1)(A) and 8bis(5)(E) of the 2005 Draft SUA Protocol into Part VII of the
120

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J.

107, 122 (January, 2007).
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safety and security of international maritime navigation.' 2' Once again,
however, the Protocol does not contain a definition of terrorism, but
instead a terrorist-purposes provision-article 3 bis (1)a - based on the
definition found in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 122 An act is thus criminalized under
the Protocol when its purpose, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population or to compel a Government
or an international organization to
23
do or to abstain from doing any act.
According to Article 3bis(1)a an offense within the meaning of
the Convention is committed if a person for the purpose referred to
unlawfully and intentionally:
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharging from a
ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCNbiological, chemical, nuclear-weapon and other nuclear
explosive devices-in a manner that causes or is likely
to cause death or serious injury or damage;
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural
gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance, in such
quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause
death or serious injury or damage;
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or
serious injury or damage; or
24
(iv) threatens to commit any of these offences.1

121

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-

ism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38349, at Preamble, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178
U.N.T.S. 38349.
122 Id. at art. 2, para. 1(b). "Any.. .act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act." Wolfrum, supra
note 21, at 650 n2.
123 See The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, supra note 121, at art. 2, para. 1(b).
124 IMO, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and
Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference: Protocol of 2005 to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Mari-
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Article 3bis(1)b focuses on the transportation of materials that
could be used in a terrorist attack. 12 5 It prohibits the shipping of BCN
weapons, source material not covered under the International Atomic
Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards agreement, other explosive
or radioactive material to be used in a terrorist attack or such a threatened
attack, and any equipment, materials or software or related technology
that is intended to contribute to the design, manufacture or delivery of a
BCN weapon.12 6 The provision relating to dual-use goods may give rise
to problems for determining whether such goods found on board a ship
point to an offense under the Convention. In most situations, a seafarer
would not have the requisite general knowledge and intent. Furthermore,
a typical seafarer would
not know what is in a container ordinarily sealed
12 7
and loaded at port.
In addition, the transportation of nuclear material is not considered an offense if, subject to specific conditions, such item or material
is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported
under the control of, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. 2 The fact that the Protocol further grants
recognized nuclear weapon States a privileged position with respect to
other States encountered opposition during the negotiations and may well
prevent certain
countries from adhering to the amended Convention in
29
the future. 1
Under the new Protocol, a person also commits an offense within
the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and
intentionally transports another person on board a ship knowing that the
time Navigation, 3bis (1)a IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) (available from the IMO upon request).
125 Harrington, supranote 120, at 123.
126 id.
127 Consideration of a Draft Protocol to the Convention For The Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; Comments on the
Protections Afforded to the Shipping Industry, U.S.-ICFTU, Sept. 20, 2005,
IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15114, No. 11.
128 IMO, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1998, IMO Doc., http://www.imo.org/
Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id-259&doc id-686; see generally BlancoBazdn, supra note 114, at 719.
129 See Balkin, supra note 5, at 23; International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 122; see generally Harrington, supra
note 120, at 123.
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person has committed an act that constitutes an offense under the SUA
Convention or an offense set forth in the nine anti-terrorism conventions
listed in the Annex.13 Thus, Article 3ter considerably broadens the scope
of conduct relevant to the SUA Convention offenses.' 3' When adhering
to the Protocol, if a State is not a party to a treaty listed in the Annex, it
may declare that the treaty in question shall be deemed not to be included
in that provision.
Article 3 quater makes it an offense to unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with the commission of any
of the offenses in the Convention, to attempt to commit an offense, to
participate as an accomplice, to organize or direct others to commit an
offense, or to contribute to the commissioning of an offense.
An important innovation is the new article 8bis covering cooperation and procedures to be followed if a State Party desires to board
a ship flying the flag of another State Party when the requesting State
Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on
board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in, the commission
of an offense under the Convention. 32 However, before boarding, the
express authorization and co-operation of the flag State is required. Such
authorization may be given in general or ad hoc.1 33 A flag State may
further authorize the boarding State to exercise powers of, or in relation
to arrest, detention, forfeiture and prosecution.134
A State Party may notify the IMO Secretary-General that it
would allow authorization to board and search a ship flying its flag, its
cargo and persons on board if there is no response within four hours. 3 ' A
State Party can also notify that it authorizes a State Party to board and
130

See IMO, Background Information on the 2005 Protocols to the SUA

Treaties, Oct. 10-14, 2005, IMO Doc., http//www.imo.org/Newsroom/
mainframe.asp?topic id 1018&doc id=5334.
131See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 122, at art. 2.
132 IMO, Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at
International Conference, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA
Treaties, Oct. 10 14, 2005, http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.aps?
topic id=1018&doc id=5334.
133Wolfrum, Radiger, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations under
International Law (The 28th Doherty lecture), at 11, April 13, 2006, http://www.
itlos.org/news/statements/Wolfum/Terrorism /20at /2OSea.28.04.06.pdf.
134 See id.
135 id.
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search the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to question the
persons on board to determine if an offence has been, or is about to be,
committed.1 36 Finally, a State Party may grant the authorization to board
a ship under its flag when requested.' 3 During negotiations on the
amendments no agreement could be reached that a flag State would automatically be deemed to have authorized a boarding when it fails to
respond to a request by another State to board 1within
a certain timeframe
38
-as had been advocated by the United States.
In addition, Article 8bis includes important safeguards for innocent seafarers and carriers when a State Party takes measures against a
ship, including boarding. 139 These safeguards include: not endangering
the safety of life at sea; ensuring that all persons on board are treated in a
manner which preserves human dignity and in keeping with human rights
law; taking due account of safety and security of the ship and its cargo;
ensuring that measures taken are environmentally sound; and taking
1 40
reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed.
When carrying out the authorized actions under this provision, the use of
force is to be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of
officials and persons on board, or where the officials are obstructed in
the execution of these actions. 14 Any use of force shall not exceed the
minimum degree necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. These
use of force provisions are
consistent with current practice on the use of
1 42
force in international law.

136

IMO, Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at Inter-

national Conference, supra note 132, at Boarding Provisions.
137 id.
138 See generally The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, supra note 122.
139 IMO, Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at
International Conference, supra note 132, at Boarding Provisions.
140
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141 id.
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Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988
and A Draft Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988
Comments on Counter-Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Boarding Provisions
Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc. LEG/Conf.15115, (Sept. 22, 2005), at
22.
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States Parties shall also be liable for any damage, harm or loss
attributable to them arising from measures taken pursuant to this article
when the grounds for such measures prove to be unfounded, or unlawful,
1
or exceed those reasonably required in light of available information. 43
This provision concerning liability of States for an illegal or unfounded
boarding constitutes an important safeguard ensuring
that vessels are not
1 44
stopped and searched without reasonable grounds.
These boarding procedures do not change any rules of international law since 145 they are in conformity with the legal framework
established by Articles 92 and 110 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Both articles allow flag States to enter international
treaties granting a non-flag State the right to board their vessels on the
high seas.14 6 It has, however, been observed that these boarding
provisions are more limited than those contained in the 1995 Agreement
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.'14 That
Agreement provides for the boarding and inspection of a fishing vessel
on the high seas if there are sufficient grounds to believe that it has
seriously violated the rules concerning fishing. 4 8 No ad hoc authorization by the flag State is required. 149 The protection of living resources is
obviously regarded as more of a technical question, while the fight
against terrorism is considered to have highly political overtones. Thus,
flag States seem much more reluctant to agree to a limitation of
sovereignty in that context.
The new Article 1I bis states that, for the purposes of extradition,
none of the offenses shall be regarded as a political offense or as an
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offense connected therewith or inspired by political motives. 50 This
provision directly follows the model of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. 5 1 According to the new
Article 1Iter, the obligation to extradite or afford mutual legal assistance
need not apply if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for
believing that the request for extradition has been made for the purpose
of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender, or that
compliance with the request would
cause prejudice to that person's
15 2
position for any of these reasons.
In line with the most recent United Nations anti-terrorism conventions, the Protocol also contains a savings clause-Article 2bis:
nothing in the Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, nor
does it apply to the activities of armed forces during armed conflict or
the activities undertaken
by military forces of a State in the exercise of
1 53
their official duties.
The amendments to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf reflect those in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA
Convention.
A new Article 2bis broadens the range of offenses included in the
Protocol. A person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and
intentionally uses against or on a fixed platform any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to
cause death or serious injury or damage; or discharges from a fixed
platform, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious
substance, in such quantity or concentration, that it causes or is likely to
150
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cause death or serious injury or damage; or threatens to commit any of
these offenses when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 154 The new Article
2ter includes the offenses of unlawfully and intentionally injuring or
killing any person in connection with the commission of any of the
offenses, attempting to commit an offense, participating as an
accomplice, organizing or directing others to commit an offense.' 55
F. CONCLUSION

While piracy an is age-old phenomenon plaguing mankind, terrorism at
sea has only manifested itself in recent times with the hijacking of the
Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985 serving as a wake-up call.
Because the rules of international law relating to piracy are not applicable mutatis mutandis to maritime terrorism, the international community
has since been striving to adopt a series of legal as well as practical
measures in order to prevent the recurrence of such a terrorist act in the
future.
The 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol addressed the danger of
terrorism at sea for the first time. The SUA constituted an important
milestone in the development of an international anti-terrorist legislation.
These instruments were a continuation of the "sectoral" approach of
dealing with international terrorism. Additionally, these instruments
represented an important extension of a cooperative law enforcement
regime into a wholly new area 156 because they contained a finely
balanced aut dedere aut iudicare scheme and gave preference to the
specific enumeration of offenses over any attempt to define terrorism or
terrorist acts. 157 They, however, faced the criticism that they were of a
reactive rather than a preventative nature. 158
IMO, Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at
International Conference, supra note 132, at 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA
Protocol.
155 IMO, Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at
International Conference, supra note 132, at 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA
Protocol.
156 See Freestone, supra note 59, at 3 16.
157 Plant, supra note 4, at 56.
158
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114

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

[v. 15

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a gruesome
demonstration that means of transport can be used as a weapon of mass
destruction. 159 As a result, it became obvious that the 1988 SUA
Convention and Protocol required revision and updating in order to be
rendered more effective. The 2005 amendments to these instruments
significantly expanded their scope by providing for an international
treaty framework for combating and prosecuting individuals who use a
ship as a weapon or means of committing a terrorist attack, or transport
by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection with weapons
of mass destruction programs. Furthermore, there is a mechanism to
facilitate the boarding in international waters of vessels suspected of
engaging in these activities. 16 The freedom of navigation, therefore had
to be restricted, but only with the explicit authorization of the flag State.
Once these 2005 instruments are in force, it will no longer be possible for
a State Party to refuse a request for extradition or for mutual legal
assistance on the grounds that1 61the offense may be characterized as
politically inspired or motivated.
The SUA Convention and its Protocol in their revised forms are
complementary to the various practical measures put in place over the
past years within the framework of the IMO. These new instruments are
a major step in the right direction and a further reflection of a shift in
mood of the international community and the perception that terrorism is
an international crime
that can only be tackled successfully by concerted
1 62
action.
international
As long as the 2005 SUA Convention and its Protocol have not
entered into force, the Proliferation-Security-Initiative (PSI) announced
by the United States in 2003, 163 which has since been endorsed by almost
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90 nations, 164 will remain the most important tool to fight the prolifera65
tion of weapons of mass destruction using maritime transportation.1
The PSI is a multilateral initiative intended to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the materials used to construct them. It
explicitly contemplates boarding ships and, if necessary, using armed
forces to seize weapons and the materials used to make them.1 66 The PSI
is a political alliance and not based on an international agreement. 167 The
United States has further negotiated a number of bilateral PSI ship boarding agreements, particularly with countries having the largest ship
registries 16 in the world, whose regulations contain more stringent
restrictions of the flag State principle
in connection with ship boarding
69
Convention.1
SUA
revised
than the
Taking into account the changing nature of the terrorist threat,
which has grown more urgent in recent years, international law is slowly
adapting to become a more efficient means for fighting terrorism at sea.
The interdependent nature of the world's economies also means that a
successful terrorist attack on the international transport system might
well trigger a chain reaction that could affect the entire world. 70 Nevertheless, whatever the legal and practical measures devised by the
international community in order to combat maritime terrorism may be,
no one can ever say with certainty that these will be sufficient or
effective to deter a terrorist attack. 17 1 These measures could only prove
their true value in the face of a planned, imminent or actual attack. No
one, however, would wish that we have to face that test.
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